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ABSTRACT

The expansion of Egyptian radio and television, with underlying political motivation dating from the 1952 revolution, is due to extensive resources committed to the establishment and programming of radio and television systems. Television, introduced almost ten years after the revolution, remains a limited and urban medium, while Egyptian radio has become the most extensive system in any developing country in Africa and the Middle East. This study focuses on Egyptian radio, examining radio's role both in Egypt's national and political development and in Egypt's attempts to disseminate the government's view of what is best for the Arabs. Discussion topics include postrevolution history, broadcasting facilities, radio receivers and listening patterns, radio services, domestic and regional services, and international beamed broadcast. (JM)

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DOUGLAS A. BOYD is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Delaware. Research for this project was made possible by a University of Delaware Faculty Research Grant.

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EGYPT has probably committed more resources to the establishment and programming of its radio and television systems than any other developing country. Developing countries often have adequate broadcasting systems, but Egypt has built a powerful and relatively well programmed system to serve its citizens. Situated in the northeast corner of the African continent, at a crossroads of the Arab world, Egypt is a relatively large country—387,000 square miles, or about one and one-half times the size of Texas. The majority of Egypt's approximately 35 million inhabitants reside within a 15,000-square mile area of arable land in the Nile Valley and Delta regions, an area easily served with a single reliable radio signal. But Egypt's radio transmitters additionally serve a regional and international community; there is hardly a place in the Arab World which is not reached by one of Egypt's Arabic services.

No broadcasting system, particularly one in the Middle East, can be meaningfully studied outside its physical and cultural context. Weather, geography, language and religion have had a pronounced effect on media development in the Middle East. The expansion of Egyptian radio and television, however, has had an underlying political motivation which dates from the 1952 Egyptian revolution.

This study concentrates on Egyptian radio. While television was introduced almost ten years after the revolution, it has not had the domestic or regional impact that radio has had. Television remains an essentially urban medium, its audience restricted to those who can afford sets and have access to electricity; it is Egyptian radio that reaches rural Egypt and can be heard throughout the Arab World. The study examines radio's role in Egypt's national and political development and its role in Egypt's attempts—primarily under Nasser—to disseminate the government's view of what is best for the Arabs.

Political Developments

To understand Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power and the popularity he enjoyed in the Middle East, it is important to recognize that before the July, 1952, revolution deposed King Farouk, Egypt had been ruled or dominated by foreigners for several hundred years. Following Napoleon's arrival in Egypt in 1798, an Albanian named Muhammad Ali founded a royal family whose descendants included the deposed Farouk. The royal family, however, was not always in command of the country. France and Britain either directly administered the country's financial affairs or had outright political control. While several movements were started in the first half of this century to free Egypt from colonial domination, they did not succeed in attaining complete freedom. After World War II, British troops stayed in Egypt in support of the United Kingdom's obvious interest in remaining in proximity to the Suez Canal, a financial asset operated by an international European corporation.

It was a group of Army officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, who felt that their positions in the Egyptian Army provided a sufficient power base to overthrow the Farouk regime. The rationale for the revolution included a desire to bring Egyptian rule to the country, an intense dislike for the British presence in Egypt, the Farouk government's handling of the Egyptian participation in the 1948 Palestine War and Farouk's messy personal life. The Free Officers' movement brought an end to a corrupt regime and started Egypt on a course which would make her both a regional and a Third World power.¹

After the revolution of July 23, 1952, Mohammed Neguib, one of the older, more experienced officers, was named the Republic's first President. The man who actually held the power was Nasser, who became President in 1954 and served as Egypt's leader until his death in 1970. While Nasser's measures to gain and hold political power gave him the name "strongman," he was a gifted propagandist. Probably better than any other Middle Eastern leader, he understood the uses to which the mass media, particularly broadcasting, could be put for political advantage. While Nasser's role in Middle East and specifically Egyptian history is both applauded and scorned,² he is remembered as a man who

tried to bring Egypt and the rest of the Arab Middle East a measure of strength and unity.

Radio Broadcasting

Egyptian broadcasting did not begin as a government-operated monopoly. Its origins are not unlike those of systems in some Western countries, including the United States, where radio amateurs who were interested in experimenting with radio and entrepreneurs who wanted to develop the medium for advertising purposes began building transmitting stations. During the 1920s more than a hundred of these stations were reportedly in operation in Egypt³ but most of the transmissions had ceased by 1930 when interest on the part of amateurs had diminished and economic conditions were such that radio as an advertising medium could not support a viable service; there were just too few sets in operation by that time.⁴ The sets which did exist were owned by members of the upper class in cities where electricity was available, mostly Cairo and Alexandria. Apparently many early set owners were not solely interested in Egyptian broadcasts and preferred to listen to European short-wave broadcasts.

No official regulations for broadcasting stations existed in 1930, so radio had an unofficial status. One report from the early 1930s stated that "[t]he identity of [the two Cairo stations] is known to the public, but officials are careful to avoid 'learning officially' of them since any cognizance would probably necessitate closing the stations."⁵

In 1931 the government reacted to this chaotic situation by closing the private stations, and for a time Egypt had no radio service. Official Egyptian radio historians see these early stations as having operated with "no national objectives for the public interest . . . [A]ll they were interested in was material gains."⁶

Rather than leaving broadcasting to the private sector and attempting to regulate it, the Egyptian government decided that radio should be a state activity. However, the country did not then possess the technical expertise to construct and operate a radio facility. On July 15, 1932, the Ministry of Communication sent a memorandum to the Council of Ministers requesting permission to begin a radio service and suggesting that the Marconi Company of the United Kingdom be considered as the contractor for the

service.⁷ One week later, the Ministry request was approved and shortly thereafter the government signed a ten-year renewable contract with Marconi. The contract stipulated that Marconi should build and operate a non-commercial broadcast facility to be financed by receiver license fees collected by the government. Sixty per cent was to go to Marconi, 40 per cent to the government.⁸ On May 31, 1934, the new Marconi-run Egyptian radio service began.⁹

From a small studio complex in Cairo¹⁰ Egyptian radio programming over a 20-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter began to take shape. Almost from its beginning until the present, Egyptian broadcasting has presented programming which either appealed to or was designed for the Western community (e.g., Western music and French and English newscasts). While Egyptian radio got started quite late by Western standards, the Egyptian service was among the first viable operations in the Middle East. Egyptian programming was raised to a relatively sophisticated level, due in part to its location in a country with an abundance of acting and musical talent. Egyptian motion picture production was thriving by the 1930s and thus provided a large talent pool from which radio could draw. Even so, the service was heavily influenced by the Westerners Marconi brought to Egypt as managers and consultants. The high quality of Egyptian radio personnel came to the attention of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which brought Egyptians to London when the BBC started its Arabic Service in 1938.¹¹

The Marconi-run radio service proved to be popular with Egyptians, and by December, 1939, the number of radio sets in Egypt was estimated at 86,477, with a yearly license fee equivalent to \$4.¹² While the license fee alone put radio ownership out of reach for the average Egyptian, sets were located in public places, such as coffee houses and cafes, where those who did not have sets could gather for information and entertainment.

The regulation of Egyptian radio was handled by several government bodies. It remained under the Ministry of Communication until August 20, 1939, when it was placed under the Ministry of Social Affairs. During World War II, for "public security" reasons, it was placed under the control of the Ministry of Interior. In November, 1943, Marconi's ten-year contract was renewed, but

the new contract required that Egyptians take a more active part in their radio service by stipulating that 75 per cent of salaried employees and 90 per cent of hourly employees be Egyptian. The renewed contract gave Marconi operation of the facilities until December 31, 1949, at which time they would become government property.¹³

After World War II, and in response to a growing feeling that Westerners should not be in charge of this important national asset, the government terminated the Marconi contract because of "national considerations" and the Ministry of Social Affairs officially took over the radio service on March 4, 1947.¹⁴

After the termination of the Marconi contract, a period of Egyptianization followed and the government tried to find the best means of fitting broadcasting into its bureaucratic structure. The Ministry of Communication was given the responsibility for the technical aspects of the radio service while programing was put in a separate department under the Ministry of Social Affairs. The government soon began to realize that because of radio's unique nature it could not be run in accordance with established civil service and state financial regulations. Law No. 98, promulgated in 1949, attempted to give radio more freedom by assigning it independent status under the Council of Ministers. The law gave operational responsibility to a board of directors and it stipulated, for the first time since the inception of Egyptian broadcasting, that the official language of the service would be Arabic.¹⁵

Programing also underwent some changes with the emergence of two distinct services. The main program, in Arabic, was broadcast eleven hours a day and the European Program was broadcast four hours a day.¹⁶ While programing on both services was varied, entertainment and cultural programs tended to predominate.

During the Marconi era, signal strength remained relatively low, with a total medium-wave power of 22 kilowatts. There were no short-wave facilities.¹⁷ Between the 1947 takeover and the 1952 revolution, plans were initiated to increase the medium-wave power of the service by the addition of a 50-kilowatt American-made RCA transmitter.¹⁸ Since this transmitter was in service by the time of the revolution, the 1952 medium-wave power is officially given at 72 kilowatts—a figure which should be noted because of a dramatic increase in transmission power to come.

Post-Revolution History

When the Free Officers signalled the beginning of the July 23, 1952, revolution, one of their first targets was the Cairo radio station—a common practice in revolutions. While Neguib and Nasser set about transforming Egypt into a republic and initiating improvements in educational and health facilities and land tenure, Nasser was beginning to solidify his plans for the political role he wanted Egypt to play in the Middle East, Africa and the Third World. In *Philosophy of the Revolution*, Nasser noted three areas of influence in which he felt that he and Egypt could function in the battle against imperialism and colonialism. He called these “circles”: the Arab circle, “the most important, . . . the one with which we are most closely linked;” the second circle, the African continent on which Egypt is located and where Nasser described a struggle in progress between five million whites and 200 million Africans; and the third circle “which circumscribes continents and oceans and . . . is the domain of our brothers in faith,” the Islamic circle.¹⁹ He would later involve Egypt in yet another “circle”—the Third World. Nasser’s book would serve as a general blueprint for his political ambitions and for the broadcasting services which he would establish to promote these ambitions.

Almost from the beginning of the Republic, the government sought to control the mass media. Egypt had had an active press before the revolution and, while the government did not officially take over publication establishments until 1960, there was only minor opposition to Nasser’s policies while the press was “free.”²⁰ Because radio was a government service prior to the revolution, it immediately became the Free Officers’ and later Nasser’s official voice. The broadcasting media have been shifted to several bureaucracies within the government and reorganized many times, never achieving autonomy. They have either been under direct control of the President’s office or positioned in such a way as to allow him day-to-day contact through a minister.

In November, 1952, radio was placed under the newly formed Ministry of Public Guidance. Later, in 1958, it was placed directly under the Office of the President.²¹ During the 1958-1961 union between Syria and Egypt, the United Arab Republic,²² Egypt’s broadcasting system was incorporated into the U.A.R. Broadcasting System. There was some sharing of personnel between the two

countries, but Egypt, with a more developed and better equipped radio system, exported experts to Syria or brought Syrians to Cairo to receive training and to work on projects of common interest to both countries. The Union appears to have had little effect on Egypt's broadcasting system, but the 1958 to 1961 period was nevertheless an important one for Egypt. It was during this time that broadcasting facilities were greatly expanded, an important reorganization took place, and television was started.

After the dissolution of the Union, Egypt moved to create a semi-autonomous broadcasting entity which allowed the sale of commercial time. The organization had very limited autonomy, and its association with the Ministry of National Guidance continued.

Before the 1952 revolution broadcasting officially had no national goals. Since the revolution the government has attempted to use the media to develop Egypt, as well as the rest of the Middle East, both politically and culturally. The 1959 Presidential Decree reorganized broadcasting and gave it an "economic character." It also established a series of goals for the radio and television services:

- 1) Elevating the standards of the arts.
- 2) Strengthening national feeling and social cooperation, spreading solidarity between social groups and supporting accepted traditions.
- 3) Participating in the spread of culture among the masses.
- 4) Discussing social problems and strengthening spiritual and moral values.
- 5) Reviving the Arabic literary, scientific and artistic heritage.
- 6) Informing the public about the best products of human civilization.
- 7) Enlightening the public about both internal and international news.
- 8) Informing foreign countries about the U.A.R. and the Arab World.
- 9) Encouraging talents in different areas of thought and creativity.
- 10) Strengthening relations between national residents and expatriates.
- 11) Providing public entertainment.²³

In 1966 broadcasting was again reorganized and radio, television and broadcast engineering were given separate administrative status under the Ministry of National Guidance. This arrangement

was a forerunner to the present structure which was formalized by a decree issued by President Nasser on August 13, 1970. The Egyptian Radio and Television Federation was established,²⁴ but broadcasting maintained its association with the Ministry of National Guidance,²⁵ and the Minister's relationship with the organization was clearly defined. The Federation is headed by a Council of Secretaries, the Chairman of which has ministerial rank and is appointed by the President. The Federation has four main divisions: Radio, Television, Broadcast Engineering and Economic Matters. The decree gives the Federation complete responsibility for all matters relating to broadcasting, internally and externally, and grants it some independence with respect to budget planning and equipment acquisition.²⁶

It is interesting to note that the objectives of the Federation as specified in the Presidential Decree are somewhat more specific than those outlined in 1959:

- 1) Providing efficient performance of broadcasting to insure service to the people in the national interest.
- 2) Developing the concept of ethical news broadcasting.
- 3) Creating the proper climate for the development of creative talent and the free expression thereof.
- 4) Expressing people's daily problems and demands.
- 5) Increasing the standard of broadcasting beamed abroad.
- 6) Promoting the vocational and technical standards of those associated with broadcasting.
- 7) Applying scientific knowledge to broadcasting.²⁷

While the implementation of the reorganization decree was temporarily delayed by the transition between the Nasser and Sadat governments, the organization existing in 1975 is expected to endure in the foreseeable future. Some expansion will probably continue, but broadcasting in Egypt has attained what many officials believe to be an optimal level of development. The various changes which took place before 1970 resulted, in part, from inadequate, piecemeal planning and confusion as to how and where broadcasting should function within the bureaucracy.

Financial considerations were important, too. While there has been little challenge to the decision of the early 1930s that

broadcasting would be a state function, the means of financing the activity has been a matter of controversy. Nasser's decision to allow the sale of a limited amount of commercial time did not bring substantial revenue to the media, partly because his own economic policies stressed increasing government activity in the "public sector" of the economy. The severe limitation on products which could be imported tended to discourage foreign companies from trading with and advertising in Egypt. During the Nasser presidency radio license fees were discontinued and at one point Egypt resorted to a unique means of financing radio broadcasting. A fixed amount was added to individual electric bills. This is surprising when one considers that electricity is provided to urban areas only, and that a large percentage of radio receivers are of the portable transistor variety. For a time there was a yearly license fee on television receivers, but this, too, has been discontinued. License fees in Egypt were difficult and expensive to collect and tended to discriminate against those who could benefit most from the media.

Another concern of the Nasser presidency was to organize the media so that they could be carefully monitored by the Presidential Office. However, broadcasting expanded at such a rapid rate under Nasser that effective administrative control became increasingly difficult.

Broadcasting Facilities

As previously noted (Note 10) the first Marconi-built studio was a modest facility which served the needs of Egypt's pre-war service. The original facilities were later expanded but it was not until after the war that the 16-studio complex known as Sharafain was constructed to serve the needs of the government's initial expansion program. While some of the Sharafain studios are still used, the need for additional studio space, the desire to centralize radio production and administration, and the decision to begin a television service all resulted in the construction of the radio and television building located in the heart of Cairo on the east bank of the Nile. The studio facilities are housed on seven floors of the large circular structure, the center of which is a 28-story administration building. The complex was completed during the early 1960s and contains more than 50 studios ranging in size from

small correspondents' studios to studios large enough to accommodate orchestras.²⁸ While the building itself suffers from lack of maintenance, the studio equipment, most of which is German (except for recorders, which are mainly Ampex), appears to be well maintained. The building and the studios serve as tangible evidence of the commitment which Egypt under Nasser made to broadcasting.

This commitment to the medium is perhaps best measured by the rapid increase in transmission power which has taken place since 1952. (Table 1).²⁹

TABLE 1

Year	Medium- and Short-Wave Transmission Power 1952-1970		Total
	Medium-Wave KW	Short-Wave KW	
1952	72	-	72
1953	74	140	214
1954	176	270	446
1955	180	380	560
1956	180	380	560
1957	202	380	582
1958	544	530	1074
1959	834	500	1334
1960	834	540	1374
1961	834	740	1574
1962	834	790	1624
1968	2188	1700	3888
1969/1970	2188	1850	4038

Source: See Note 29.

Since the statistics shown in Table 1 were compiled, an additional one million watts have been added (100 kilowatts medium wave and 900 kilowatts short wave), thus bringing total transmission capability above five megawatts.³⁰ Egypt appears to have the personnel to operate and maintain these broadcast facilities. Excluding television production personnel and camera operators, the Broadcast Engineering Section of the Egyptian Radio and Television Federation employs more than 5,000 people.

Egypt's increase in medium- and short-wave power has been impressive, but it is impossible to determine accurately how this

power has been used. In the following sections discussing specific radio services, mention is made of transmission power used for these services, but all radio broadcasts, with the exception of the Alexandria local service, are routed through master control in the Cairo Radio Television Building. In a time of crisis, for example, transmitters which are used for beamed international as well as for local services have been used to expand regional services.

Until 1956, most of Egypt's transmitters were located at Abu Zabal near Cairo, the site of the original Marconi transmitter. But the 1956 Suez War demonstrated the necessity of diversifying transmitter and antenna sites. During its opening hours when British planes began to attack installations in Egypt, the Abu Zabal site was bombed, presumably to knock Egyptian radio, particularly the "Voice of the Arabs," off the air. The interruption of service was brief, but the lesson was plain: Egypt had to diversify its transmitter sites.³¹

The government is hesitant to discuss exact numbers and locations of its radio transmitters, but it is known that facilities are scattered among several locations and that others are ready at undisclosed locations so that an attack would not completely stop transmission.

Radio Receivers and Listening Patterns

Brunner, in discussing radio listening patterns in the Arab World during the early 1950s, noted the pervasiveness of group listening in coffeehouses, restaurants and other public places, particularly in rural areas.³² In the Arab World, hospitality extends to the sharing of one's radio receiver, the acquisition of which is often a status symbol to those of low income. In Egypt, receivers have been made available to listeners under various government programs, and the rapid expansion of Egyptian radio in the late 1950s and early 1960s coincided with what has been called the transistor revolution. The availability of inexpensive battery-operated radios in Egypt and the rest of the Arab World, together with the custom of group listening, has helped assure widespread reception of Egyptian radio broadcasts both inside and outside its borders.

UNESCO figures put the number of radios in Egypt at 144 per 1000 population, about average for the Middle East but among the highest in Africa.³⁴ (Such a statistic does not, of course, take into

consideration the large number of people who are likely served by one radio set.) Some of these receivers have been assembled in Egypt under various licensing and trade agreements, and it has been to the government's advantage to encourage the importation of radios from Europe and the Far East.

Radio Services

In any discussion of Egypt's radio services, it is important to note that Egyptian international services, beamed over short-wave facilities for the most part, can be clearly identified as intended for specific target areas but the same is not true of local and regional services. The U.S.'s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) classifies Egypt's radio services in three categories: Cairo International Services (including regular international services and the "Voice of Africa" service); Cairo Arab World Services (including Koran Service, Middle East Service, and the "Voice of the Arabs," all of which broadcast in Arabic); Egyptian Domestic Services (including the Main and Second Programs, People's Service, European Program and the Alexandria Domestic Service).³⁴ Distinctions between regional and local services cannot be clearly made due in part to the fact that they are all broadcast in a form of Arabic which is generally understood throughout the Middle East. Also, a powerful medium-wave signal from Cairo can be heard in many parts of the Middle East during the day as well as during the evening hours when medium-wave signals travel greater distances. The region's terrain, climate and proximity make it possible for much of the Arab World to hear the Main Program, which is essentially a domestic service. The effect is to make Egyptian radio broadcasting widely available and listened to throughout the Middle East. Of course, the same conditions allow other countries a similar opportunity. But it was Egypt which seized the initiative, and it established a clear lead before other countries entered the field.

The powerful transmission facilities the government built were only part of the story. Egypt was in a position to dominate the Arab World in the broadcasting field partly because of its large pool of talent. Long considered to be the intellectual and cultural center of the Middle East, Egypt had an abundance of actors,

musicians and writers, many of whom had worked in the movie industry. Many of these people brought with them the same revolutionary zeal which Nasser exhibited and were willing to work diligently to apply the media to developmental and political goals.

Specific Egyptian radio services are difficult to identify because, when the various services are identified on the air, whether in Arabic or a foreign language, Cairo is usually mentioned as the city of origin. For example, even the local European Service when broadcasting in English begins every newscast: "This is Cairo."³⁵ The "Voice of the Arabs" is clearly identified as such in Arabic, "Sawt al-Arab." However, it is also usually noted that it is originating from Cairo. This is probably the main reason that Radio Cairo, a term often used to describe a specific radio service, is not an accurate identification. Egyptian broadcasting officials, who associate the term Radio Cairo with the Egyptian Main Program, do not appear to be aware of the problem. It is more accurate to say that all radio services, with the exception of the Alexandria local service, are services of Radio Cairo: i.e., any transmission which originates from the Cairo Radio Television building. It would be accurate, then, to identify "Voice of the Arabs" as "Radio Cairo's 'Voice of the Arabs,'" A distinction not always clearly made by previous researchers.

Because the distinction between regional and domestic services cannot clearly be made, the following discussion is based on a two-fold classification of Radio Cairo's services: Domestic/Regional and International.

Domestic/Regional Services

The Main Program. This service is a direct outgrowth of the original one started in 1934. The eleven hours a day which were broadcast at the time of the 1952 revolution have been greatly expanded until the 1971 transmission time was 20 hours and 12 minutes a day.³⁶ Stopping short of becoming a 24-hour service, it has remained at essentially the 1971 figure: total hours per day in 1974 was 20 hours.³⁷

When the revolutionary government under Nasser wanted to expand the reach of Egyptian radio quickly, both hours of service and transmission strength were increased. Powerful medium-wave

transmitters were added, improving domestic as well as Arab World reception. Then, when Nasser decided during the mid-1950s to insure greater regional coverage, short-wave transmitters were added, making the service regional. In terms of total transmission hours of domestic/regional services, the Main Program is second only to the Voice of the Arabs with about 16 per cent of total program hours.

This service's programing can be best characterized as "general," a description supported by media officials and listeners alike. The service is sometimes referred to as the General Program. While it is often difficult to separate the informational and entertainment aspects of programing—a play will often be built around a theme such as children's respecting their parents, for example—Egyptians classify much of their programing as entertainment. When averaged, programing on the regional and domestic services is about half entertainment.³⁸ The government has sanctioned a relatively heavy entertainment diet overall, but the Main Program takes its responsibility as the "leading" service to Egypt rather seriously, particularly in terms of maintaining contact with its listeners.

As with other radio services, news is an important part of programing. For all of Egypt's radio services it originates from a central news operation, thus facilitating coordination among the various services. Most observers agree that Egypt is not atypical of countries where news is either controlled or supervised by a government agency: news, commentary and editorial comment are not easily separable. The tone of the Main Program, as well as other services, has become less political since the 1967 war and particularly since Mr. Nasser's death. The service still has several important goals,

the most important of which are the supportative maintenance of the morale of the audience to stay ready and alert for the battle [against Israel] and awareness of the facts, dimensions, goals, and means of psychological warfare, and the strengthening of the relationship between the masses and the active army on the front.³⁹

Radio Cairo's Main Program continues to be heard in other Arab countries. We must assume that the distinction between Radio Cairo's Main Program and the other services was clear to both researchers and respondents in a 1965 survey in which the Main Program was said to be the service listened to by 21.5 per

cent of respondents in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰ In a 1973 survey, 18 per cent of respondents in Bahrain said they listened to Radio Cairo at least once a week.⁴¹

Voice of the Arabs. The Voice of the Arabs is probably the best known of the Egyptian services and is the one Nasser used most frequently to promote his political philosophy and goals. Voice broadcasts began less than one year after the revolution, on July 4, 1953.⁴² From its modest half-hour-per-day beginning, the Voice grew to a 24-hour-a-day service whose far-reaching medium- and short-wave broadcasts could be heard in all parts of the Arab World. It was the prominent means of reaching the first of Nasser's "circles"—the Arab Circle. Over the years, the Voice of the Arabs developed programing designed for specific countries or geographical areas. During the early period of its development the broadcasts tended to concentrate on the Maghrib (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). It was also during this time that Egypt adopted the policy of allowing leaders of African and Middle Eastern revolutionary movements to establish offices in Cairo and to use Egypt's broadcast facilities to further their causes, a privilege enjoyed by representatives of the Algerian revolutionary movement,⁴³ for example. During the latter half of the 1950s President Nasser's stature in the Arab World was greatly enhanced by actions starting with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and continuing through the overthrow of the Iraqi government in the summer of 1958. It was during this period that Egypt engaged in several harsh propaganda wars with Jordan and Iraq—wars which Egypt appears to have won.⁴⁴ In the 1960s the Voice's broadcasts seemed to lose some of their effectiveness as they concentrated on the peninsula countries, most notably Jordan; Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Saudi Arabia in particular was portrayed as "unprogressive" and even as an enemy when the Kingdom supported the Royalists during the Yemen war.

Arabs, is Faysal an Arab or a British King? Arabs, is Faysal a King of the Muslims' Holy Land, or a King of the Jews and the Saxons? Arabs, by God, Arabs, what is the people's verdict, what is God's verdict on such an agent King? We know the verdict and wait for the execution. For the people always convict agents; and always inflict the traitor's destiny on all agents.⁴⁵

Ahmed Said, who was director of the service for many years, became a popular commentator in the Middle East, but he ap-

parently only voiced certain themes which appear to have been passed directly from President Nasser.⁴⁶ While the aims of the Voice now include "personifying the national thought of the Arab masses, presenting the Cairo viewpoint to the Arab populace, and emphasizing the relationship between the future of Egypt and the Arab nation,"⁴⁷ the Voice's aims were not always so altruistic, particularly when the service called for violence and assassinations. Although it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the programing policies of the two main regional services, the Voice of the Arabs has tended to be less restrained in terms of calling for changes in governments within the region. Charles Issawi probably best described the Voice when he observed in 1963 that it "has to be heard to be believed: for sheer venom, vulgarity, and indifference to truth it has few equals in the world."⁴⁸ The service has since moderated its tone a great deal, and observers have even called it "tame." An important change occurred in 1967, shortly after the Six Day War. Egyptian broadcasts were deceptive regarding Egypt's losses during the first few days of the conflict; Ahmed Said repeatedly told listeners that Egypt had achieved military victories. The result was morally disastrous to the Arab World. When the truth became known about how extensively Egypt had lost territory, equipment and lives, it was a serious letdown for listeners who looked to Egypt as the leader among countries in the "struggle" against Israel. Said additionally lost credibility at home, where listeners knew too well that the victories were fictitious. Said was dismissed from his position as Voice Director in the hope that his removal would help eliminate self-deception as a factor in the stigma of Egypt's defeat. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who well remembered Said's broadcast thrusts against the Saudi royal family, reportedly asked for Said's dismissal during the Khartoum Summit following the war as a precondition to granting financial aid to Egypt.

The Egyptian mass media have shown a marked interest since the 1967 war in increasing the accuracy of news reports and decreasing the role of the media as the disseminator of political propaganda. The Voice's goals, as of 1971, appeared to admit some past derelictions; they now include "adher[ence] to the scientific interpretation of language [and] purif[ication of] that language [of] repetition, exaggeration, superficiality, and unpreparedness."⁴⁹

It has been within the framework of the Voice of the Arabs that specified transmission hours have been devoted to the Palestine Program. Facilities have been provided to representatives of various Palestine organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization to broadcast their views to the Arab World. The amount of programing time, or in fact whether any time is allotted, depends on the Egyptian government's relations with these Palestine organizations. For example, after the September, 1975, Israeli-Egyptian Sinai agreement, Egypt revoked the PLO's broadcasting privileges because it was using the facilities to criticize the agreement.⁵⁰

Curiously enough there is a foreign-language service attached to the Voice of the Arabs rather than to the Foreign Language Programing Section. Hebrew broadcasts to Israel began in the 1950s but they were not significantly expanded until the late 1960s. As of 1974, there were 16 hours a day of Hebrew-language broadcasts to Israel.⁵¹

The Voice's signal strength seems to be effective in delivering programing to other Arab countries if the 1973 USIA Bahrain survey is any indication: 25 per cent of respondents indicated that they listened to the Voice at least once a week.⁵²

People's Program. In May, 1959, the government started the People's Program for a specific audience and for specific reasons. That audience is the mostly illiterate, primarily rural people (fellaheen) who make up the majority of the Egyptian population. The main purpose of the service is the promotion of development among this target audience, particularly in the general areas of literacy training and population control.⁵³ This service appears to have been used, as have other Egyptian domestic services, to promote a sense of nationhood among the fellaheen, who traditionally have little knowledge of and respect for the national government.⁵⁴ It was felt that the other radio programs were too concerned with cultural, informational and entertainment programing to present the types of educational materials needed by rural illiterates who often live at the subsistence level. In this respect, Egypt has probably done more than any other Arab country to promote educational radio programing for rural citizens.

Programing starts in the afternoon and lasts until the early hours of the morning. The full-time staff of approximately 75 persons tailors programs for the "masses," in part by restricting the vocabulary used and concentrating on the spoken colloquial rather than the neo-classical language used throughout the Middle East in both electronic and print media. The service often uses what is ostensibly entertainment in order to present an educational theme, e.g., a dramatic sketch in a local dialect showing how a farmer's life can be bettered by adopting a particular farming technique. Egypt has used this service to present Farm Forum programs. Fawzia Al-Mowaled, the Director of the People's Program, first learned of the format after attending a meeting in Rome where a delegate from India described his experience with India's farm forums. The Egyptian forums first started on a modest scale with six clubs in one geographical area. The number of these listening clubs has increased only slightly due to limited programing and field staff. For a time, both radio and television were used to provide media input for forum discussion groups. The radio forums were aired at 8 p.m. on Tuesdays. Then a discussion period was followed by a television program demonstrating a product or process which had been introduced by radio. To implement this project, one thousand television sets were distributed to rural villages with electricity. However, problems common in developing countries—weather conditions, problems with set operation and adjustment and inadequate repair facilities—made more than half of the sets inoperative.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the radio forums are still broadcast during the non-summer months.

The People's Program is broadcast only on medium wave and is intended primarily for domestic audiences. Nevertheless, people in neighboring countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, send mail about its programs. The government's support of the service is shown in the increase in program hours between 1971 and 1974, from nine hours a day,⁵⁶ to ten and one-half.⁵⁷

Second Program. This service, begun in May, 1957,⁵⁸ is similar to the BBC's old "Third Programme": directed to an educated audience which enjoys serious music and literature. Broadcast for three and one-half hours each evening,⁵⁹ the Second Program's listeners are concentrated in, but not restricted to, the Cairo metropolitan area. Because of its emphasis on serious music, FM

facilities would be more appropriate, but the transmissions are on medium wave only.

Middle East Service. This service, which can be heard throughout Egypt, is primarily intended to be regional. It was started in May, 1964, for the purpose of advertising international products and services in the Middle East, thereby serving to attract to Egypt badly needed foreign exchange. Programing is essentially a "mixed-bag" of popular music and "short programs that depend on light entertainment, creative style, and suspenseful material that attract the listener to its programs."⁶⁰

Because a strong signal is required to insure the wide coverage advertisers demand, the Alexandria megawatt medium-wave facility is used to transmit the service during hours whose number has increased slightly since 1971 to thirteen a day, usually two hours early in the morning, between 6 and 8, and the remainder during the late afternoon, evening and early morning hours.

The Middle East Service does not usually show up on USIA surveys outside Egypt. Such a survey in 1975 indicates that this service may be more popular within Egypt than previously thought. Among local services listened to at least once a week, the Middle East Service ranked behind the Main Program but ahead of the Voice of the Arabs in popularity.⁶¹ The research department for Egyptian broadcasting has not conducted surveys of the service's popularity in other countries,⁶² which may be surprising in light of the usual practice of basing advertising rates on number of listeners. Egyptian officials insist they have no trouble attracting sponsors.

Koran Program. In March, 1964, this religious service was started to broadcast "the Holy Koran and its interpretation to all parts of the world."⁶³ Transmitted for fifteen hours a day over both medium and short wave, this programing is primarily aimed at a regional audience, although listeners in Egypt also have access to the service, of course.

Mostly it features readings, usually entire chapters and verses, from Islam's Holy Book, interviews and discussions with leading Islamic scholars. While the service was probably started for sincere religious reasons, its establishment as a distinct regional service clearly had political motivation as well. Communist ideology and the religion of Islam being considered incompatible, President

Nasser's close identification with the Soviet Union during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s suggested the need for a reminder to Nasser's admirers that Egypt had not lost its religious orientation. More obvious political implications are found in the stated goals of the broadcasts, including "the intellectual confrontation to refute Zionist courses that fight the values and principles that essence of revealed religions calls for. . . ."⁶⁴

European Program. The European Program is primarily designed for domestic consumption and is not connected with the short-wave broadcasts in European languages. Transmitted by medium wave, the service is intended for foreigners who reside in the Cairo metropolitan area where the majority of potential listeners live. Additionally, the program serves Egyptians of Greek, Italian and French extraction and educated Egyptians who usually have fluency in at least one European language. It does not appear that the service was expanded after the revolution to provide news for members of the diplomatic corps in Cairo, as was the case in Saudi Arabia when the English service was started there in the mid-1960s. Embassies which carefully watch the Egyptian media for clues to government policy shifts would be more likely to concentrate on such influential newspapers as *Al-Ahram* or respected Arabic-language radio commentators. The service is an outgrowth of local programming in French and English which was started when the Marconi operation began in 1934. The service broadcasts fourteen hours a day, longer on Friday and Sunday, the respective Moslem and Christian sabbaths. It allots specific periods of time for news, music and other features in the five languages the service uses: Greek, Italian, English, German and French. Approximately one-third of total broadcast time is devoted to news broadcasts in the five languages. For example, the first hour and fifteen minutes of the early morning transmission, which starts at 7, consists of fifteen-minute newscasts in these languages back-to-back.⁶⁵

The program staff is entirely Egyptian. Enough local language-trained talent is available to staff the service, a situation not found in other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia.

Music Program. The newest of the domestic/regional services is the Music Program started in March, 1968.⁶⁶ Since then it has gradually expanded to fifteen hours a day. Music is presented in blocks of time devoted to Arabic and Western recordings. Western

music, mostly popular European and American records, gets more hours than Arabic music. (Western music is presented on a medium-wave frequency separate from that of the Arabic music.)

Sudan Program. Egypt and the Sudan have had close historic ties which were further strengthened during the period of British influence. The Sudan Program was started in 1949 as one of the "corners," or features, of the Main Program. Beginning as a 30-minute-a-week feature consisting of "a talk about Sudan, a Sudanese song and a commentary on the news," the program was gradually expanded until it reached 30 minutes a day in 1953.⁶⁷ In 1954 the government made the Sudanese program an entirely separate service and opened an office in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, to help provide programming.⁶⁸ The content is primarily concerned with maintaining good relations between Egypt and the Sudan. It is intended to be heard in both countries on medium and short wave. Transmission hours have shown a slight decrease since 1971 to six hours a day.⁶⁹

Alexandria Broadcast. This service, which began in July, 1954, was designed to be the first of a series of local radio stations in various cities and regions in Egypt. It is the only local service which originates outside the Cairo broadcasting complex.

The concept of local radio was not pursued for reasons primarily financial and political; the government preferred to centralize operations conveniently in Cairo. "Alex" is an ideal location for a local service. Egypt's second largest city, and a major seaport and summer recreation area, its climate and flavor are distinct from that of Cairo. The service is largely self-sufficient, producing most of its own programs. Using a medium-wave transmitter near Alexandria, it broadcasts approximately seven hours a day, fourteen on Friday.

Those concerned with the administration of this service appear to be unique in their efforts to utilize the Egyptian Radio Television Federation's research facilities. At one point the service asked for and received help in determining listener attitudes about and preferences for the service.⁷⁰

International Beamed Broadcasts

Short-wave beamed broadcasting from Middle Eastern countries is a post-World War II activity. Egypt lacked short-wave facilities

before 1952, but the situation quickly changed after the revolution. One year later, in 1953, short-wave transmitters were inaugurated for the purpose of disseminating more widely such services as the Main Program, which at that time was not received well in areas such as Morocco and Yemen. By adding short-wave frequencies to medium-wave, the government strengthened its broadcasts to the First Circle, the Arab Circle, but also served the Second Circle, the African continent, with programming in many African languages. To reach the Third Circle, the Islamic Circle, it was used to broadcast to Moslem countries in the Near and Far East. Finally, short-wave transmissions also reach expatriates and Arabic speakers in foreign countries.

For those who have listened to Radio Cairo's various international services, the service's motto, "Peace between nations and honorable independence for all,"⁷¹ may appear to have been little more than rhetoric, particularly during the 1952-1970 "Nasser Years." Until the late 1950s, the short-wave facilities were used primarily to broaden coverage of regional "First Circle" services such as the Voice of the Arabs. However, as short-wave transmitters were added, Radio Cairo increased its broadcasts in various African languages to areas where Egypt believed it could help existing liberation movements or to inspire new ones. Some of these African-language broadcasts were not always identified as Egyptian, as evidenced by a service named the Voice of Free Africa. This quasi-clandestine service was reported to have originated from Cairo from where its Swahili broadcasts were relayed to a short-wave transmitter located somewhere in upper Egypt. The tone of these early broadcasts was clearly anti-white with special reference to French and British colonial influence in East and Central Africa.⁷² A USIA report said the Voice of Free Africa "... encourages nationalist movements, attacks the policies of colonial powers, and stresses racial tensions in Africa and the United States. ... [It] calls for strikes, boycotts and other actions, including violence."⁷³

Until the early 1960s, Cairo's broadcasts south of the Sahara were modest in number and experimental in nature. However, the government apparently felt that an increased radio propaganda effort in Africa's vernacular languages would help establish Egypt (and Mr. Nasser) as a dominant political force on the continent.

The early 1960s were an important period: the Cairo broadcasting complex was completed, thus providing both office and studio space for expanded broadcast schedules; transmission power and frequencies used had increased, and Egypt's hospitable attitude toward African liberation groups during the 1950s had brought to Cairo Africans who were native speakers of languages used in the expansion program. The availability of African students studying at Egyptian universities, in addition to personnel who had been hired on a contract basis from African countries, provided the necessary talent for the vernacular services.⁷⁴

July is the month usually reserved for project dedications (the 1952 revolution came in July). So it was in July, 1961, that Egypt's international broadcasting services were "significantly increased and extensively reorganized."⁷⁵ In fact international broadcast hours did increase 34% between July, 1960, when the weekly total was 317 hours, and July, 1961, when the weekly total was 424 hours.⁷⁶

A structural change placed African-language broadcasts under a new service, the Voice of Africa, not to be confused with the Voice of Free Africa. The Voice of Africa was so named to serve the Second Circle in the same manner that the Voice of the Arabs was intended to serve the First Circle. To the African languages used before the reorganization—Amharic, Hausa, Somali, Swahili—were added Fulani, Lingala, Lunda, Nyanja and Shona.⁷⁷

A few other African languages were added during the remainder of the 1960s. But despite this and other efforts, Nasser did not become the African leader of his vision. The African radio campaign was not an overwhelming success for reasons related to political priorities in Middle Eastern countries and economic difficulties experienced by Egypt during the early 1960s. Egypt's financial difficulties were in part caused by prolonged and expensive military involvement in Yemen. Although the African-language broadcasts were limited in terms of hours per week, Browne reports one survey that suggests their credibility was quite high.⁷⁸ The Voice of Africa did not achieve the popularity enjoyed by the Voice of the Arabs because, among other things, of a high turnover in personnel.

A new broadcasting service, the Voice of Islam, was announced by the Egyptian government in November, 1960.⁷⁹ So named

specifically to serve President Nasser's Third Circle, the service was intended to be an administrative umbrella for those language services which had existed since the late 1950s to serve Asian nations predominantly or largely Moslem. The languages included Thai, Malay, Indonesian, Bengali, Urdu, Turkish, Pushtu, Persian and Kurdish.⁸⁰ But Egypt's Voice of Islam did not become a viable service and was discontinued for reasons similar to those afflicting the Voice of Africa. This did not doom the various language services themselves, only their "umbrella." Languages still broadcast include Persian, Bengali, Hindi, Indonesian, Malay, Pushtu, Thai, Urdu and Turkish. In addition to these Islamic languages and Arabic, Egypt's international service includes Italian, Lingala, Nyanja, Oulof, Portuguese, Russian, Sesotho, Shona, N'debele, Somali, Spanish, Swahili, Yoruba and Zulu.⁸¹

It is interesting to note that ten years after Egypt announced its Voice of Islam, Saudi Arabia, the home of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, started its Voice of Islam utilizing a powerful 1.2 megawatt medium-wave transmitter near Riyadh. The service is distinct from Radio Cairo's because the Saudi "Voice" uses Arabic only and is primarily intended for listeners in the Middle East.

Since Egypt first started expanding its radio facilities, personnel and hours of transmission have steadily increased. Nasser's leadership between 1952 and 1970 provided political stability within Egypt. Military conflicts in the Middle East and rather severe domestic economic problems apparently have not seriously af-

TABLE 2

Weekly Broadcast Hours, 1950 to 1973

<i>Country</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>1973</i>
U.S.A. ^a	497	1495	1907	2001	2060
U.S.S.R.	533	1015	1908	1884	1952
Chinese People's Republic	66	687	1267	1292	1326
German Federal Republic	-	315	779	806	806
United Kingdom	643	589	723	746	751
Egypt	-	301	540	601	613

^aIncluding Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe.

fects Egypt's determination to become and remain a dominant regional and a major international broadcaster. As of 1973, Egypt ranked just behind the BBC as sixth largest international broadcaster in the world in terms of weekly program hours⁸² (Table 2).

Egyptian radio officials were considering in 1975 a proposal from within the Ministry of Information to establish a 24-hour-a-day world-wide English- and French-language radio service. Despite the large expense and the involved logistics—including the likelihood of transmitters in other countries—the proposal was being given serious consideration.⁸³ Whether President Sadat will continue to expand Egypt's international broadcasting apparatus remains to be seen. Egypt's radio broadcasting organization may fairly be termed a reflection of its governmental bureaucracy: large, overstaffed and cumbersome. The push for continued expansion may simply reflect the desire of top administrators to perpetuate their positions.

Some Conclusions

In terms of both regional/domestic and international radio services, Egypt has created the most extensive system of any developing country in Africa and in the Middle East, perhaps in the world. This achievement is particularly noteworthy in that the expansion came during the seventeen years between 1953 and 1970. Several conclusions about Egypt's use of radio broadcasting may be warranted.

1) The late President Nasser was clearly the most influential person in Egypt's radio expansion: he both originated the concept of a powerful radio service and supported its implementation as proposed by advisers such as former Minister of Information Abdel-Kader Hatem. Perhaps the single most important reason for Nasser's attention to radio broadcasting was a background which made him almost unique among Arab leaders in the 1950s. Nasser was a relatively sophisticated man, yet, like President Sadat who succeeded him, he came from modest rural beginnings and that gave him insight into how effective radio could be in conveying Arabic rhetoric for propaganda purposes. He also realized that radio could help bring needed information to rural areas for purposes of development. Although television is expanding in the Middle East, it is still a predominantly urban medium which

reaches few villages without electricity. On a regional basis, Nasser understood that the transistor revolution which started in the late 1950s would help his revolution. While other Arab governments could stop the importation of Egyptian newspapers and restrict the activities of Egyptian diplomats, they were unable to do anything about Egypt's powerful transmitters and the message they brought this predominantly oral culture eager to hear what Nasser had to say.

2) Nasser knew that other Arab countries had modest radio services to meet their domestic needs and to broadcast to other countries in the region. By 1956 when the Voice of the Arabs, for example, began to have an impact on other countries in the area, countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia found themselves unable to use the same medium to refute what Egypt was saying about them. Nasser grabbed the lead, but ultimately other Arab countries, in the rush to defend themselves, acquired the means to provide their own citizens with an alternative to Egypt's services, thereby laying a basis for fostering indigenous economic and political development after the radio wars ended.

3) Radio Cairo's apparent success in achieving desired political reactions in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen during the late 1950s and early 1960s seemed to give Egypt's media managers and other government officials the idea that Cairo possessed a kind of radio magic. However, Radio Cairo's impact began to diminish during the late 1960s as other countries established services sufficient to challenge Radio Cairo and to provide an alternative. Another reason for the loss of impact may have been Egypt's lack of interest in research. Cairo relied on intelligence from its diplomatic missions, which often netted little more than signal strength reports. Letters from listeners were scrutinized, but apparently Egypt to this day has consistently failed to conduct public opinion research in other countries or to acquire surveys done by other broadcasters such as the Voice of America or the BBC. Its officials even seem to be unaware that other broadcasters, including some in the Middle East such as Jordan, have conducted such research.⁸⁴

4) The 1967 Middle East war had an effect on Egypt's use of radio. Egypt lost territory, economic position and prestige as a result of this war, and its radio services have tended to reflect

these losses. Regionally, Nasser found himself in a defensive rather than offensive posture after the war and he became economically dependent on subsidies from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to replace revenues lost when the Suez Canal was closed. This understandably tempered, if it didn't altogether stop, what had been an almost steady propaganda barrage against the "unprogressive" countries such as the oil-producing Gulf and peninsula states. Nasser also seemed to realize that attacks on other Arab leaders were counterproductive to his goal of uniting the Middle East under his own leadership.

Since Mr. Sadat became President in 1970 after Nasser's death, Egypt's tone has become even more temperate. The primary reason for this is perhaps evident in the posture of the Sadat government. Those who were closely associated with both men tend to agree that in comparison Sadat is less egocentric, less myopic and generally more statesmanlike. Egypt's informational efforts have tended to reflect the Sadat style rather than the Nasser style of diplomacy. The powerful Egyptian radio services once used by Mr. Nasser to promote revolution in other countries are now used by the Sadat government to inform Arabs throughout the Middle East of the reasoning behind Egypt's various agreements with Israel over territory captured during the 1967 war, agreements which have not always been well received in the rest of the Arab world. Egyptian radio services, primarily the Main Program and the Voice of the Arabs, still hold attention in other Arab Countries. The 1974 USIA Kuwait radio survey indicates that these two services account for 17.9 and 17.5 per cent respectively of those who listen to foreign Arabic-language radio broadcasts at least once a week.⁸⁵

5) Despite Egypt's attempts to use its radio services for national development, there has not been a firm commitment on the part of the government to tackle literacy and population problems in that medium. There is no lack of enthusiasm on the part of broadcasters to do more in this area; but the development of the more traditional rural areas requires both policy and financial commitments on the part of the government. Perhaps the government, in trying to pursue national development goals while involving itself politically and militarily in the rest of the Arab World, has simply exceeded its means.

The greatest contribution which the People's Service and other individual services have made to urban and rural development is perhaps in the area of nationbuilding. The fact that the government recognizes the importance of communicating with those who are outside the print media channels of communication has undoubtedly brought a traditional and often skeptical people closer to national unity. Radio has widened the horizons of the fellaheen beyond family and village. Abu-Lughod has concluded that most information from the outside world is brought to members of the rural villages he studied by radio, and those who receive information in this medium tend to pass it along to others.⁸⁶

Time referred to Nasser as "virtually a creature of radio." He once indicated during one of Egypt's propaganda attacks on other Arab countries how important he believed the medium to be when he gave the following response to U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld's question, "Can we disarm the radio?"

How can I reach my power base? My power lies with the Arab masses. The only way I can reach my people is by radio. If you ask me for radio disarmament, it means that you are asking me for complete disarmament.⁸⁷

Nasser died of a heart attack in his Cairo home shortly after he ignored doctors' orders and switched on a bedside transistor radio to hear Radio Cairo's five o'clock news.⁸⁸ Despite his lofty intentions, Mr. Nasser fell short of his goal of bringing economic prosperity and military success to his country, but he did make Egypt an international broadcaster to be reckoned with.

NOTES

1. There are several reliable sources on modern Egyptian history. See, for example: Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972); Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

2. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Egypt's Anti-Nasser Campaign," *Newsweek*, April 1, 1974, pp. 42-3.

3. UNESCO, *Press, Film, Radio* (Paris: UNESCO, 1949), p. 217.

4. Lawrence D. Batson, *Radio Markets of the World*, U.S. Department of Commerce Trade Promotional Series No. 109 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 103.

5. *Ibid.*

6. "The History of the U.A.R. Radio Since its Establishment in 1934 Until Now," *Arab Broadcasts* (August 1970), p. 63. Trans. Fatma Barrada.

7. "What Do You Know About Egyptian Broadcasting?" *Arab Broadcasts* (July 1971), p. 63. Trans. Fathi Yousef.

8. "The History of the U.A.R. . . .," p. 63.

9. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 63.

10. *Wireless World* had the following comment on the Marconi radio studio in Cairo: "Egyptian broadcasting has gone 'all British' in the matter of its new studio at Cairo, the architectural design of which follows the Tudor style. The studio is approached through a small soundproof lobby illuminated by an old English lantern. The specially treated walls of the studio are panelled and at one end is an old English fireplace on which stand three electric candles showing red, green, or white, as desired, for signalling from the control room." See "England in Egypt," *Wireless World*, January 4, 1935, p. 15.

11. Neville Barbour, "Broadcasting to the Arab World," *Middle East Journal*, 5:60 (Winter 1951). Arabic was the first foreign language in which the BBC broadcast. See Asa Briggs, *The Golden Age of Wireless* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 398-406.

12. UNESCO, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

13. "The History of the U.A.R. . . .," p. 64. When the government nationalized the Marconi facility it provided that Marconi would be compensated for lost revenue because of early contract termination, that it would pay the station's foreign director until the original 1949 contract ended, and that local personnel would continue to work under the conditions under which they were hired by Marconi.

14. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 63.

15. "The History of the U.A.R. . . .," p. 65.

16. "The A.R.E. Broadcasting in Brief," mimeographed (Cairo: Egyptian Radio-TV Federation, n.d.), p. 1.

17. The number of transmission hours, the number of transmitters and whether a short-wave transmitter existed prior to the revolution differ depending on which source is consulted. The following sources do not agree on

the above: Charles Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 216; UNESCO, *Press, Film, Radio* (Paris: UNESCO, 1949), p. 218; and Wilson P. Dizard, *Television: A World View* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 147. Official Egyptian publications agree that while Marconi may have introduced a short-wave transmitter into Egypt it was inoperative by the end of World War II, and therefore the 1952 medium-wave transmission power is given at 72 kilowatts. This was affirmed by broadcast engineers with whom I talked in August, 1974.

18. El-Garhi El-Kashlan, Chairman, Broadcast Engineering Section, Egyptian Radio-TV Federation, personal interview, Cairo, August 10, 1974. Mr. El-Kashlan was sent to the U.S. to receive training on the installation of the transmitter.

19. Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 85-111.

20. For a succinct yet comprehensive discussion of the press in Egypt see Adnan Almaney, "Government Control of the Press in the United Arab Republic," *Journalism Quarterly*, 49:340-48 (Summer 1972).

21. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 64.

22. After the union was dissolved in 1961 Egypt kept the name United Arab Republic by which it was known until after Nasser's death. It is now the Arab Republic of Egypt (A.R.E.).

23. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 64.

24. In translating the name of the Egyptian broadcasting organization from Arabic to English, the word Federation or Union can be used. I have chosen to use Federation because it appears to be preferred by those officials with whom I have talked.

25. The ministry has since been renamed the Ministry of Information. According to an official of the Arab States Broadcasting Union, the decision to change the name came from members of the Arab League who believed that the previous name provided an inaccurate description of the ministry's function. Salah Abdel Kader, Secretary General, Arab States Broadcasting Union, personal interview, Cairo, August 12, 1974.

26. Egypt is an example of a developing country plagued by problems with the purchase of equipment and spare parts because foreign exchange was in short supply. The Federation now may use some of the foreign exchange it receives from the sale of programs to other countries to buy equipment and supplies.

27. "Text of the Presidential Decree on the Law Concerning Establishment of the Radio and Television Federation," *Arab Broadcasts* (August 1970), pp. 50-1, trans. Fatma Barrada.

28. The history of the facilities was gathered from several sources during July and August, 1974, e.g. the El-Kashlan interview, *op. cit.*, and Rokia Mustafa Kamel and Saber Abdul Halim, broadcast facilities engineers, personal interview, Cairo, August 6, 1974.

29. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 76.

30. El-Kashlan interview.
31. El-Garhi El-Kashlan, the Chairman of ERTF's Broadcast Engineering Section, was at the transmitter site during the British attack. In addition to the diversification of sites, Egypt reportedly had established at least one clandestine transmitter by 1958. See "Voice of Venom," *Time*, March 3, 1958, pp. 28-9.
32. Edmund deS. Brunner, "Rural Communications Behavior and Attitudes in the Middle East," *Rural Sociology*, 18:149-55 (March 1953).
33. UNESCO, *World Communications* (Paris: 1975).
34. Kathleen Hogan, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Liaison Officer, personal letter to the author, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1974.
35. The practice probably came from the BBC's well known ID for its World Service and language services, "This is London."
36. "The A.R.E. Broadcasting in Brief," p. 2.
37. Statistics concerning the broadcasting time of each service were supplied by Mohammed Shaban, Chairman of Radio Broadcasting, Radio-TV Federation, personal interview, Cairo, August 14, 1974.
38. "The A.R.E. Broadcasting in Brief," p. 4. Also, Abdel Moez Mahrnas, General Controller of Research and Statistics, private interview, Cairo, August 11, 1974.
39. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 68.
40. Associated Business Consultants, Beirut, Lebanon, "A Seven-Day Media Effectiveness Survey Conducted on Behalf of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service (Jordan) in the City of Riyadh," n.d., pp. 8-10.
41. United States Information Agency, "Media Habits and VOA Listening Among Priority Audiences in Bahrain," R-1-74, March 27, 1974, p. 2.
42. "A.R.E. Broadcasting in Brief," p. 3.
43. M. Abdel-Kader Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause* (London: Longmans Group, Ltd., 1974), p. 167.
44. There are several references to the "radio battles" in Middle Eastern literature. See, for example, former U.S. Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman's *Iraq Under General Nuri* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 50-7. Lieut. General Sir John Glubb, who was dismissed by King Hussein as Commander of the Arab Legion in 1956, believes that his dismissal was caused in part by Egyptian radio attacks which started in late 1955. Lieut. General Sir John Glubb, personal letter to the author, Sussex, England, April 17, 1973, p. 4.
45. BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, No. 2460, May 9, 1967, p. A6.
46. Mustapha Amin, Editor, *Al-Akbar Al-Youm*, personal interview, Cairo, August 12, 1974.
47. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 69.
48. Charles Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 217.
49. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 69. For a discussion of Arab media during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars, see William A. Rugh, "Arab Media and Politics During the October War," *The Middle East Journal*, 29:310-28 (Summer 1975).

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51. Mohammed Sharf, Director General for Foreign-Language Programing, Egyptian Radio-TV Federation, personal interview, Cairo, August 6, 1974.
52. "Media Habits and VOA Listening . . ." p. 2.
53. Fawzia Al-Mowaled, Director of People's Program, personal interview, Cairo, August 10, 1974.
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59. Shaban interview.
60. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 69.
61. United States Information Agency, Office of Research, "VOA Audience Estimates for Egypt 1975," E-13-75, December 12, 1975, p. 5.
62. A. Mahrns interview.
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64. "What Do You Know . . . ?" p. 72.
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68. *Ibid.*
69. Shaban interview.
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